

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET

DISPATCH NO. MGFA-6285

SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 24 March 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *18/4*

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

SPECIFIC— Control and Motivation of Staybehind Agents

Reference— MGKA-32753, MGKA-36225 *- Kibitz field project outline*
Neither to BOB
military ratings for staybehind agents (in HTC 3.10.51)

1. In MGKA-32753, it was pointed out that within six months we should have to provide our German staybehind agents an answer to the question: Why should we continue to be employees of an American sponsored staybehind activity when Western Germany will soon have an Army and similar plans of its own? Herewith, for your approval, are certain commitments which can be made by staybehind case officers to answer this question and prevent the loss of agents in whom we have invested a great deal of time and effort. These suggestions have been written from the KIBITZ point of view, but the problem is a general one and the solution can be applied to all staybehind agents where necessary.

2. The KIBITZ program was begun during late 1948 and 1949 when there was very little public discussion of possible German rearmament. Members of the American-recruited section were personally contacted by [] and convinced that they should engage in these activities which combined German and Western idealism and were financed and guided by the Americans. It will be recalled that in the recruitment of KIBITZ personnel, the idea of using disabled war veterans, women, old people and others who could probably escape one or two slave labor drafts was necessarily discarded. The reason needs no further discussion here than to state that field tests and other assessments have proven that staybehind activities to be effective must have able-bodied agents who want to do what they are doing and have none of the psychological shortcomings common to maimed war veterans, cripples and the like. This has left us with a group of individuals who can loosely be termed active types. Their mean age is well above that announced for the coming German conscription, yet opportunities will arise for them as former officers and experienced non-commissioned officers. Because they are the type who want to do something for Germany, it is believed that many of our staybehind agents are even now making inquiries to their former wartime commanders and other contacts in efforts to acquire a more active role in the West German or proposed European Army.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

2-EE
1-BOB
2-COS
2-FOB

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. *9*
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: *2011*
AUTH: *IR 772*
DATE: *3/27/01* REVIEWER: *()*

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECURITY INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION

IR COPY

WASH-CIA-PRO-865

32-6-2 7741

SECRET

MGFA-6285

3. Our problem then is how to keep present and future KIBITZ personnel favorably motivated toward us, at home and in their present occupations, and in training for their staybehind activities. L's estimate of the numbers of persons who may be expected to desire an active role in West German defense is 8 - 10 in the US recruited element and 12 - 14 key agents of the KIBITZ 15 or German recruited element. (See para 4, MGKA-36225). L thus urgently needs the tools for counter-action.

4. The following commitments are suggested for use by staybehind case officers as necessary:

a. Continue the general line that the activities are by Germans, for Germany and the West, conducted, guided and financed by the Americans. Reasons for this could be given extemporaneously as necessary (i.e. the Americans have the money, equipment and other facilities, they are in the American Zone of Germany, they have the experience and they have the organization for coordinating such activities with the overall Western Defense effort. Further, that upon activation such personnel will be under the direct command of SHAPE. (This, it will be recalled, is the future of all our operations in case of war). Thus we have answered the agent's question of sovereign loyalty and why he is not working for the German Army.

b. Where it becomes necessary to hold personnel in agent assignments, the case officer will enter into written contracts with them. Terms of these contracts should be fairly generous. However, the major financial commitments to the agent would only be invoked upon his activation as a stay-behind agent, i.e. after a hostile occupation and once he or his team come on the air or report intelligence through other communications methods. Realizing the tenor of German thinking and the militaristic leaning of some of the agents involved, we suggest that the pay scales follow simulated military ranks:

1) That individuals who had former rank in the German Army be accepted at that rank plus one promotion to be held and used as a final closing argument at the case officer's discretion. Where no former military ranks were held, one would be decided upon between the case officer and the individuals concerned. Suggested rank would depend upon the agent's age, education and value to the program.

2) Remuneration for work performed would begin upon activation as described above and would be at the then going rate for similar American military ranks. (This, of course, is the key to the whole matter: German or American rank, whichever is fancied by the agent, with pay at American military rates. We do not believe that this is too much for the risk and service contemplated. In support of this, it is recalled that agents in the Philippines and other areas during World War II were given simulated ranks and later even integrated into armies of their own liberated nations.

SECRET

SECRET

MGFA-6285

3) In the meantime, while we are still in touch with these staybehind agents, the following plan would be used to get them to accept money and thereby become more definitely committed. Using the general line of reasoning that Americans in a reserve military status receive training pay and other emoluments, we could actually pay the agents who were under contract 5 per cent annually of the simulated rank's pay. We expect that the majority of persons with whom we would enter into such contracts would fall somewhere in the company officer grades with annual salaries in the neighborhood of \$6000 - \$7000, 5 per cent of which would be \$300 - \$350. Such payments would be in Deutsche Marks. While this is a reversal of the present volunteer status of KIBITZ personnel, it will certainly tie the agents to us psychologically and increase our control.

5. We have immediate need of a means to keep present staybehind agents from deserting our program for more active or remunerative roles in Western German defense. The above is our best group thinking on the problem to date. We do not mean to give the impression that the whole KIBITZ effort will disintegrate without such a program, nor that, if approved, it will be applied to all agents. However, in view of the present announcements regarding German conscription, sound planning demands that we provide ourselves with an answer to this question.

// 6. Your cabled approval of the above is suggested. //

// This
// does
not answer
the problem
of conscrip-
tion.

SECRET

COPY

22-6-7941